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McCarty v. McCarty: A Former Spouse's Claim to
a Service Member's Military Retired Pay
Is Shot Down
INTRODUCTION
Recently, both pension fund assets and the number of divorces
in the United States have increased significantly.' The combina-
tion of these two facts has presented state courts with a difficult
issue: whether, and how, to divide what is probably the largest'
and most complex asset a couple owns when they petition for a
dissolution of their marriage. Most jurisdictions recognize an ex-
spouse's claim to a portion of a working spouse's pension.4 Courts
and commentators, however, have been divided over the question
1. In 1970, the total amount of assets in public and private pension funds was $264.1
billion. By 1979, the figure reached $639.6 billion. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, Statistical Abstract of the United States 344 (101st ed. 1980). Divorces in the
United States increased from 708,000 in 1970 to 1,170,000 in 1979. Id. at 83.
2. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847, 544 P.2d 561, 566 (1976); Cearley v.
Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976); Note, Community Property-Military Retire-
ment Benefits-Prior to Accrual, Military Retirement Pension Earned During Coverture is
Community Property Subject to Division at Time of Divorce, 9 ST. MAv's L.J. 135, 141
(1977).
3. See generally D. McGLL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (3d ed. 1975);
Bonavich, Allocation of Private Pension Benefits as Property in Illinois Divorce Proceed-
ings, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1979); Hughes, Community Property Aspects of Profit Sharing
and Pension Plans in Texas-Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Fu-
ture, 44 TEX. L. REV. 860 (1966); Kent, Pension Funds and Problems under California
Community Property Laws, 2 STAN. L. Izv. 447 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Kent].
4. See Malone v. Malone, 587 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1978) (vested civil service pension);
Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 578 P.2d 1006 (1978) (civil service disability pension); In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561 (1976) (non-vested pension plan); In re
Marriage of Mitchell, 195 Colo. 399, 579 P.2d 613 (1978) (vested, contributory pension plan);
In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979) (non-vested pension);
Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 1974) (noncontributory pension plan); Hutch-
ins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976) (vested, contributory pension
plan); Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn. 1978) (vested, matured pension); In re Mar-
riage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. 1975) (vested profit sharing plan); McGrew v. Mc-
Grew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 377 A.2d 697 (1977) (non-vested, noncontributory pension plan);
Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978) (vested, contributory pension plan);
In re Marriage of Tiffee, 27 Or. App. 211, 555 P.2d 798 (1976) (vested private pension);
Daniels v. Daniels, 490 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (vested private pension); Englert v.
Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978) (vested retirement fund); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5
Wash. App. 446, 488 P.2d 763 (1971) (non-vested pension); Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis.
2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975) (vested pension).
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of the distribution of military retired pay upon dissolution of a
marriage.5 In McCarty v. McCarty,' the United States Supreme
Court resolved this issue, holding that military retired pay is not
subject to division between spouses as part of a property
settlement.
Although regulation of domestic relations falls within the power
of the states,' the Supreme Court has assumed jurisdiction in this
area when a federal right is at issue.' In Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo,10 the Supreme Court held that the federal statutory
scheme governing Railroad Retirement benefits11 precluded Cali-
fornia from applying its community property laws and dividing a
spouse's Railroad Retirement pension.12 The decision was inter-
preted narrowly and restricted to its facts by state courts across
the country." As a result, even after Hisquierdo, military retired
5. For decisions granting a former spouse a share in military retired pay, see VanLoan v.
VanLoan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977) (non-vested); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal.
3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974) (non-vested); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96
Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975) (vested and matured); In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App.
3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (1979) (vested and matured); Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App.
699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978) (vested and matured); In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185
(Mont. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) (vested
and matured); Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 463, 375 A.2d 659 (1977) (vested and matured);
LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969) (non-vested); Cearley v. Cearley, 544
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976) (non-vested); Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355
(1975) (non-vested). See also Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension
Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEIPmDiNE L. REV. 191 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Pattiz); Comment, Apportionment of Community Property Interests
in Prospective Military Retirement Benefits upon Divorce, 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 72 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Apportionment of Community Property]; Recent Developments, Com-
munity Property-Deferred Compensation: Disposition of Military Retired Pay upon Dis-
solution of Marriage-Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973), 50 WASH. L. REV.
505 (1975). A limited number of courts have refused to divide military pay. See Fenney v.
Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976); In re Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, 538
P.2d 1347 (1975), aff'd sub nom., Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976); Howard v.
Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976). See also Goldberg, Is Armed Services Re-
tired Pay Really Community Property?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Goldberg].
6. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
7. Id. at 236.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See In re Burris, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Ohio ex rel.
Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930).
9. See, e.g., McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905) (rights under the Homestead Act con-
flict with state community property laws); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (Federal Trea-
sury regulations governing savings bond ownership conflict with community property laws).
10. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
11. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231u (1976). See infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
12. 439 U.S. at 591.
13. See Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 123 Ariz. 466, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979); In re Marriage of
McCarty v. McCarty
pay continued to be divided between former spouses upon divorce
in accordance with state laws.'
The increasingly liberal attitude of the state courts in granting
an ex-spouse a property interest in retired pay was substantially
restricted by the McCarty decision. Before McCarty, many courts
had rejected the argument that Congress, by creating the statutory
framework governing military benefits, had intended to pre-empt
state law. 15 In McCarty, however, the Supreme Court held that in
its enactment of the military retired pay law Congress acted with
"force and clarity" and intended to prevent the division of retired
pay upon divorce."
This note will trace the state court treatment of pension bene-
fits, and in particular military retired pay, prior to the McCarty
decision. It will then examine the McCarty decision and critically
evaluate the Supreme Court's rationale in light of Hisquierdo and
other precedents. The practical implications of the decision and its
potential impact on future decisions will also be analyzed. The
note will conclude with a brief review of legislation pending before
Congress in regard to an ex-spouse's right to retired pay.
STATE POLICY ON DIVORCE, AND DISTRmUTION OF PENSION
BENEFITS
In the United States, nine jurisdictions follow community prop-
erty laws in distributing assets upon divorce. 17 Under these prop-
Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812 (1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Milhan v.
Milhan, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 IMI. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511
(1979); In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1980); In re Marriage of Miller,
609 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918
(1981); Trahan v. Trahan, 609 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
14. See In re Marriage of Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812 (1980), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Milhan v. Milhan, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); In re Marriage of Musser, 70 IlL
App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (1979); In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981).
15. See supra note 14.
16. 453 U.S. at 236.
17. For the purposes of this note, the terms "marital property" and "community prop-
erty" will be used synonymously. There are nine jurisdictions following community distribu-
tion of assets upon divorce (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington and Puerto Rico) and forty jurisdictions following equitable distribution
upon divorce (all remaining states and the District of Columbia except Mississippi, Virginia
and West Virginia). Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q.
229, 249-52 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster]. The equitable division jurisdictions
incorporate the theory that marriage is a shared enterprise to which both spouses contrib-
ute, and that upon divorce, assets acquired during the marriage should be divided equally
and/or justly. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. 91, 93 (1979) (Commission-
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erty laws, assets acquired during the marriage are community
property. 8 Assets acquired prior to the marriage, assets acquired
subsequent to a legal separation, and assets acquired during the
marriage by gift, devise, or bequest are separate property. 19 At the
time of divorce, each spouse is awarded his or her separate prop-
erty and the remaining property is divided between them. Only
three community property states require an equal division; the
others require an equitable division. 0
With the exception of only three states," the remaining forty
jurisdictions follow a system of equitable distribution of marital as-
sets at the time of divorce. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (IMDMA)"2 is typical of the legislation many
states have enacted.2 The IMDMA provides that upon dissolution,
all marital property24 shall be divided in just proportion after con-
ers' Prefatory Note); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Historical and Prac-
tice Notes); W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as DEFUNIAK].
For a comparison between the divorce and property laws of the United States with the
laws of other countries, see generally M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE
LAW (1972); Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMETr L.J. 413 (1976).
18. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (West Supp. 1981-1982); CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110
(West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2334 (West Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8
(1981); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.16.030 (West Supp. 1981). See generally DEFUNIAK, supra note 17, at § 58.
19. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (West Supp. 1981-1982); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5107,
5108 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1981); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 2341 (West Supp. 1982); NEv. REV. STAT. § 123.130 (1980) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-
8 (1981); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
26.16.010, 26.16.020 (West Supp. 1981). See generally DEFUNIAK supra note 17, at §§ 63, 69.
20. California, Louisiana and New Mexico are the only community property states which
still require an equal division of community property. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800 (West
Supp. 1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2336, 2369.1 (West Supp. 1982); Sands v. Sands, 48
N.M. 458, 152 P.2d 399 (1944). The remaining community property states grant the courts
discretion to make an equitable distribution based on state criteria. See ARMz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-318 (West Supp. 1981-1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1981);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1980); Tix. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63. (Vernon Supp. 1982); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.050 (West Supp. 1981).
21. Three states, Mississippi, Virginia and West Virginia, distribute property based on
title alone. Freed & Foster, supra note 17, at 249-251.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, I] 101-802 (1981).
23. See e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-
10-113 (Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1980); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330
(Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 48-321 (Allen Smith Supp. 1977).
24. The IMDMA defines marital property as all property which is not excluded as non-
marital property. ILL. REv. STAT. ch 40, 503 (1981). Non-marital property is defined as
follows:
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
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sideration of all relevant factors.'8 The definition of marital prop-
erty excludes from division many of those assets which, under
community property law, are treated as separate property. After
the non-marital property awards are made, however, the marital
assets are divided equitably, not equally, based upon consideration
of such factors as the duration of the marriage, the need for sup-
port, the value of each spouse's separate property and the contri-
butions of each party to the marriage.'6
Both community property laws and the marital property laws
are based on the theory that marriage is a shared enterprise, analo-
gous to a partnership. Upon termination, the assets of the marriage
should be divided as justly as possible. 7 This theory recognizes the
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or
in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage; and
(6) property acquired before the marriage.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, 1 503(a) (1981).
On February 22, 1979, Illinois Representative Leinenweber introduced H.B. 554 in the
Illinois House of Representatives to amend V 503(a) to include a seventh category which
would exclude non-vested pensions from consideration as marital property. The bill was
passed by the House and sent to the Illinois Senate. On January 14, 1981, the legislative
session ended before the bill was passed. To date, similar legislation has not been
introduced.
25. The following factors are relevant:
(1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property,
including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having
custody of the children;
(5) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage of either party,
(6) any antenuptial agreement of the parties;
(7) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, voca-
tional skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
(8) the custodial provisions for any children;
(9) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; and
(10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital
assets and income.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503(c) (1981).
26. Id.
27. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. 91, 93 (1979) (Commissioners'
Prefatory Note); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Historical and Practice
Notes).
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value of each spouse's contributions to the marriage and underlies
decisions regarding the division of pension benefits in divorce pro-
ceedings in both types of jurisdictions.28
Initially, state courts refused to classify non-vested pension ben-
efits as property,2 9 although vested pension benefits were subject to
division. 0 Because an employee, by terminating employment,
might never fulfill a retirement plan's vesting requirements to re-
ceive the pension, the present non-vested right was considered by
the courts as merely an expectancy. Before satisfaction of a plan's
vesting requirements, the employee did not have an enforceable le-
gal claim. Nor did courts recognize a present value for this possible
future benefit, where the value of the right was too speculative to
be considered marital property.3 '
The prevailing reluctance to recognize presently non-vested pen-
sion benefits troubled courts, however, in cases where the employee
was close to completing the age or service requirements to vest his
pension, which made the probability of benefit forfeiture unlikely.
Consequently, courts characterized these interests as contingency
interests subject to divestment."2 This characterization is both
more realistic and appropriate, in the opinion of some courts, since
pension benefits are earned over an often substantial period of
years, and not on the day they become vested. With each addi-
28. See infra cases cited in note 4.
29. A pension is "vested" when the employee has fulfilled a retirement plan's stated
vesting requirements such as a minimum number of years of service with the same em-
ployer. Once a pension is vested, the participant's interest cannot be forfeited by the termi-
nation of employment. Retirement plans are generally either contributory or noncontribu-
tory plans. A contributory plan requires specific contributions by the employee and thus
always includes funds of the employee. Noncontributory pension plans are funded entirely
by the employer. When an employee has an unconditional right to immediately begin to
receive his pension benefits, his pension rights are said to be "matured." Pensions that are
not matured, however, may still be vested if the employee has completed the required years
of service but has not reached a specified retirement age, upon which he can elect to begin
receiving his benefits. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 563
(1976); Kent, supra note 3, at 448; Pattiz, supra note 5, at 202-05.
30. See, e.g., Malone v. Malone, 587 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1978); In re Marriage of Mitchell,
195 Colo. 399, 579 P.2d 613 (1978); In re Marriage of Bodford, 94 Ill. App. 3d 91, 418 N.E.2d
487 (1981); Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978); Pinkowski v. Pinkowski,
67 Wis. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975).
31. See French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941), overruled in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561 (1976); Pickell v. Pickell, 76 Ill. App. 3d 855,
395 N.E.2d 673 (1979); White v. White, 136 N.J. Super. 552, 347 A.2d 360 (1975); Lumpkins
v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
32. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847, 544 P.2d 561, 565-66 (1976); Cearley v.
Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1976).
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tional month of employment, an employee increases both the
amount and his interest in the pension.3 3
Another approach taken by some courts relies on the nature and
purpose of pension plans. Rejecting the argument that pensions
are a gift from the employer," these courts have held that such
plans are more accurately classified as deferred compensation for
past services. s5 Where an employee is entitled to receive a vested
pension, the right to receive it does not depend on the employer's
generosity. Pension plans are designed partly to reward employees
for long years of service with the same company." Because benefit
amounts under most pension plans are determined by the plan
participant's employment history, the courts' view of pension ben-
efits as additional, although deferred, compensation for past ser-
vices is consistent and convincing.
The most significant change in the courts' characterization of
pension benefits occurred when the spouse's right to receive money
in the future was accorded present value.8 7 Once the courts ac-
knowledged the present value of future pension rights, the issue of
how to properly divide such rights arose.
When pension benefits are included as a marital asset, the courts
have faced difficulties trying to divide benefits which, in most
cases, have not been received. 8 A general consensus prevailed that
granting an offsetting portion of the marital property was inequita-
ble if the pension never subsequently vested or matured.39 Award-
ing the former spouse a share of the present value of the pension,
therefore, involved analysis of actuarial data on the expected life-
span of the employee. In addition to life expectancy, the courts
were forced to weigh other uncertain facts such as the likelihood of
the employee fulfilling the vesting requirements or the future sol-
33. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1976).
34. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 845, 544 P.2d 561, 565 (1976); In re Mar-
riage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 709, 388 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (1979); Cearley v. Cearley,
544 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1976).
35. In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 IIl. App. 3d 653, 659, 397 N.E.2d 511, 518 (1979); McGrew
v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 518, 377 A.2d 697, 699 (1977).
36. See D. McGiLL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 16-21 (3d ed. 1975).
37. Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 463, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977); Schafer v. Schafer, 3
Wis. 2d 166, 171, 87 N.W.2d 803, 806 (1958).
38. Although the courts acknowledged the administrative problems in valuing pensions
and supervising their distribution, it was not so burdensome so as to require that pensions
be excluded from the marital assets. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544
P.2d 561, 567 (1976).
39. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567 (1976); Note, Retire-
ment Pay: A Divorce in Time Saved Mine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1973).
19821
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vency of the employer and the pension fund. A more practical ap-
proach taken by the courts was to award a percentage of the retire-
ment benefits "if, as and when" they are received by the
employee. 0 Under this approach, the spouse would not receive any
benefits at the dissolution, but only as the pension was paid. Al-
though this increased the administrative burden on the court, it
eliminated many of the valuation problems inherent in an immedi-
ate distribution at the time of dissolution.
In divorce proceedings involving military retired pay, state
courts had applied substantially the same non-military benefits
analysis and treated military retirement pay as a marital asset sub-
ject to division."' The Supreme Court, in the McCarty case, how-
ever, analyzed the statutory framework governing military retired
pay and concluded that military retired pay could not be appropri-
ately analogized to benefits derived from private pension plans.42
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF MILITARY RETIRED PAY
Unlike private pension plans which vary from employer to em-
ployer,48 military retired pay was created by Congress and is regu-
lated to achieve federal objectives. It serves as an inducement for
recruiting and re-enlistment and it is used to provide an ordered
system for promotion and retirement.44
40. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1976); In re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567 (1976). For a discussion of the various approaches to the
division of pensions, see R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMI-
NARY ANALYSIS 135-86 (1969) (Prepared for the Special Committee on Divorce of the Na-
tional Conference on Uniform State Laws) [hereinafter cited as MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
LEGISLATION]; Apportionment of Community Property, supra note 5, at 84; Note, Division
of Military Retirement Pay Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 31 ARK. L. REV. 522, 524 (1977);
Note, Domestic Relations-Husband's "Vested" Interest in Retirement Plan is Divisible as
Marital Property, 42 Mo. L. Rv. 143 (1977); Recent Developments, Community Prop-
erty-Deferred Compensation: Disposition of Military Retired Pay upon Dissolution of
Marriage, Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973), 50 WASH. L. REV. 505, 529-
38 (1975).
41. See supra note 5.
42. 453 U.S. at 211-16, 221.
43. Private pension plans are federally regulated, however, by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.). The question whether ERISA pre-empts the
states' treatment of private pension benefits is beyond the scope of this note. For further
information see, Foster & Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J.
FAM. L. 187 (1977-78); Solomon, Beyond Preemption: Accomodation of the Nonemployee
Spouse's Interest Under ERISA, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1020 (1980); Note, Pension
Law-Family Law-ERISA Preemption of Divorce Decree Enforcement Against Pension
Plans, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 277 (1979).
44. 453 U.S. at 212 n.2, (quoting remarks of Sen. Grimes in Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 1st
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Under this statutory framework, regular or reserve commis-
sioned officers are entitled to nondisability retired pay after twenty
years of service in the Armed Forces.4 Retired pay is calculated on
the basis of the members' rank at retirement and number of years
served.46 Although retired pay terminates on the members' death,
members may designate a beneficiary to receive any payments in
arrears.47 Rather than accept retired pay, members have the option
to receive a pension from the Veterans Administration.48
Congress also established two programs to provide annuities for
the survivors of military members. The Retired Serviceman's Fam-
ily Protection Plan (RSFPP)49 is an elective system where deduc-
tions from the service member's retired pay are used to fund an
annuity payable to the surviving spouse or children upon the mem-
ber's death. These deductions cease automatically upon the death
or divorce of the service member's spouse.50 The second program is
the Survivor's Benefit Plan (SBP) " in which all retired members
participate. Under this plan, an annuity is paid to the member's
widow or widower upon the the death of the service member, and
upon death or ineligibility of the widow or widower, to the mem-
ber's surviving children."2
Sess. 16 (1861)).
45. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3911, 3913, 3914, 3929 (1976) (Army); 10 U.S.C. §§ 8911, 8913, 8914,
8929 (1976) (Air Force). See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 3917- 3919 (1976) (Army retirement after 30
years); 10 U.S.C. § 3924 (1976) (Army retirement after 40 years); 10 U.S.C. §§ 8917-19
(1976) (Air Force retirement after 30 years); 10 U.S.C. § 8924 (1976) (Air Force retirement
after 40 years). The provisions applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps require an officer
to serve 20 years and an enlisted man to serve 30 years before they become eligible for
retired pay. 10 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6323, 6326-6327, 6330, 6331 (1976).
46. 10 U.S.C. § 3991 (1976) (Army); 10 U.S.C. § 8991 (1976) (Air Force); 10 U.S.C. § 6325
(1976) (Navy and Marine Corps). The formula used to calculate retired pay is the basic pay
of the retired grade times two and one-half percent times the number of years of creditable
service. Retired members are eligible for a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 75% of the
basic pay of their retired grade.
47. 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1976).
48. 38 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976). One advantage of receiving a pension is that it is exempt
from income tax. Retired pay is taxed as income under 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(11) (1976). See
also Rev. Rul. 63-169, 1963-2 C.B. 14.
49. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1446 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The RSFPP was funded entirely by
voluntary deductions from retired pay. Due to the substantial deductions required, the plan
had few participants. S. REP. No. 1089, 92d CONG., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3288.
50. 10 U.S.C. § 1434(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
51. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The SBP is a mandatory program
created to increase participation in annuity plans. Because it is not self-financed, but par-
tially funded by the government, participation is less expensive. 453 U.S. at 215-16.
52. 10 U.S.C. § 1450 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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State courts, while aware of such federal programs, did not view
them as including a congressional intent to pre-empt state laws.
The federal pre-emption argument of retired service members was
consistently dismissed until the Supreme Court decided McCarty
v. McCarty.'
PRIOR FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS
When a state statute and a federal statute conflict, the federal
statute will prevail and pre-empt the state statute." The Supreme
Court has applied a two step analysis in examining pre-emption
issues. The Court initially determines whether Congress has "posi-
tively required by direct enactment" 5 that state law be pre-
empted. The Court next examines whether the state law does "ma-
jor damage [to] clear and substantial" federal interests.56 When
each of these questions is answered in the affirmative, federal law
will pre-empt state law.
Before McCarty, the Supreme Court had found that federal law
pre-empted state community property laws in only five cases.57
Four of these cases involved the disposition of property after the
death of the owner. The most recent case involved an ex-spouse's
claim to property at the time of the divorce. Each of these five pre-
emption cases were relied upon by the McCarty majority.
The first case to pre-empt community property law, McCune v.
Essig," was decided in 1905, where the Supreme Court held that
the Homestead Act' superseded a state statute which granted an
interest in homestead property to the homesteader's daughter."
The federal law at issue included a schedule which directed the
disposition of the property upon the homesteader's death. The Act
granted the homesteader's widow an absolute right to the land,
and therefore their daughter could claim the land only when both
the homesteader and his spouse were deceased."' The federal law
clearly prescribed procedures for transferring the ownership of the
53. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 cl. 2; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210-11 (1824).
55. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
56. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
57. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306
(1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); McCune
v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
58. 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
59. U.S. REv. STAT. tit. XXXII, §§ 2207-2489 (1878).
60. 199 U.S. at 388.
61. U.S. REv. STAT. tit. XXXII, §§ 2291, 2292 (1878).
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property which was in direct conflict with the state laws. Having
applied the two step pre-emption analysis, the Court concluded
that the state statute was pre-empted and could not operate to
pass title to the land.62
It was not until 1950 that the Supreme Court next found that a
federal law pre-empted a state community property law. In Wiss-
ner v. Wissner," a serviceman used community property funds to
subscribe to a National Service Life Insurance (NSLI) Policy. He
named his parents as beneficiaries under the policy and upon his
death, his widow brought a claim for one-half of the proceeds."
Congress established the NSLI program to provide a comprehen-
sive insurance plan for service members and veterans. Subscribers
are entitled to designate any beneficiary they choose and the pro-
ceeds are exempt from "any legal process whatever, either before
or after receipt by the beneficiary."'65 The Court held Congress had
acted with "force and clarity" to ensure that only the named bene-
ficiary would receive proceeds under an NSLI policy.66 The Court
concluded that application of the state law would "frustrate the
deliberate purpose of Congress" and as such must be pre-empted. 7
Federal regulations governing the ownership of United States
Savings Bonds were found to conflict with state community prop-
erty law in Free v. Bland" and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos.6' As such, the
Supreme Court found that those regulations pre-empted the state
laws. In Bland, the Court upheld a widower's claim to savings
bonds purchased with community funds and made payable to ei-
ther spouse. Under state law and the decedent's will, the dece-
dent's son claimed a one-half interest in the bonds. 70 The Court
found a valid federal law in conflict with a state law. 1 In denying
the son's right to any interest in the bonds, the Court held that the
62. 199 U.S. at 389. The Court noted that the application of the state law reversed the
order of the federal statute and gave the daughter an interest paramount to the widow. Id.
63. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
64. Id. at 657-58. At the time the serviceman entered the Army, he and his wife were
estranged. At the time he subscribed to the insurance policy, the serviceman contacted an
attorney seeking ways to get a divorce. Id. at 657.
65. 38 U.S.C. § 454a (1952).
66. 338 U.S. at 658.
67. Id. at 659.
68. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
69. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
70. 369 U.S. at 664-65.
71. Id. at 667-68. The Court cited the general regulations governing entitlements, 31
C.F.R. § 315.61, which specifically states that the surviving owner of savings bonds issued to
co-owners "will be recognized as its sole and absolute owner," quoted in 369 U.S. at 667.
1982] 565
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application of state law would "[interfere] with a legitimate exer-
cise of the power of the Federal Government to borrow money. ' '9 2
In Yiatchos, the Supreme Court addressed the question of sav-
ings bonds ownership where the circumstances indicated possible
fraud or breach of trust. There, the decedent used a substantial
amount of the community funds to purchase bonds, and named his
brother as owner upon his death. The Court held that federal law
could not be used as a shield to deprive the spouse of community
property rights.73 The Yiatchos Court reiterated a prior Supreme
Court decision, however, holding that in the absence of fraud or
breach of trust, federal law requires that savings bonds would pass
to the beneficiary designated by 'the owner.7 4
The final case illustrating the pre-emption of community prop-
erty law and one on which the McCarty Court placed the greatest
reliance was Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo.75 In that case, the Califor-
nia courts awarded an ex-spouse an interest in the petitioner's
Railroad Retirement Act benefits76 at the time of the divorce pur-
suant to the state community property laws. The trial court re-
fused to find that an interest existed in the possible future bene-
fits,7 7 and the California Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.7
The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that the bene-
fits were earned, in part, during the marriage and thus were com-
munity property subject to division. 9
Certiorari was granted to the United States Supreme Court and
the petitioner argued that the Act pre-empted the application of
state law, and that any retirement benefits which he might receive
were subject to congressional control under the provisions of the
federal statute. He contended that under the Act, the state courts
could not divide his future benefits or grant an offsetting award to
his former wife as part of a property settlement.6 0 The Supreme
72. 369 U.S. at 669.
73. 376 U.S. at 308-09.
74. Id. at 312. The Court remanded the case to determine whether the widow consented
to the purchase of the bonds or ratified such purchase. If she had, she would not have any
claim to them under state law. Id. at 309.
75. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
76. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231u (1976). [hereinafter referred to as "Act"].
77. 439 U.S. at 579.
78. In re Hisquierdo, 63 Cal. App. 3d 230, 133 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1976).
79. In re Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224 (1977).
80. 439 U.S. at 583. The petitioner argued that because his benefits could be withdrawn
at any time by Congress, he did not have any right to them until they were received. He
contended that the state courts had created a right which did not exist under federal law.
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Court examined the congressional purpose and the language of the
statute and concluded that the state laws conflicted with the Rail-
road Retirement Act. Because the Court further found that appli-
cation of the state community property laws frustrated the federal
interests, the Court held that the Act pre-empted the state laws. 8'
The Hisquierdo Court based its decision on its interpretation of
section 231m of the Railroad Retirement Act82 and section 659 of
the Social Security Act. 83 Section 231m clearly prohibits the antici-
pation of the payment of Railroad Retirement benefits and ex-
empts the benefits from any legal process. Section 659 provides
only one exception to the exemption: in order to insure that indi-
viduals receiving federal benefits do not avoid alimony or support
obligations, Congress allowed ex-spouses to garnish federal benefits
to satisfy financial obligations arising from a divorce. The defini-
tion of alimony, however, does not include community property
settlements or equitable property division." The Court held that
these provisions were a sufficient indication that Congress required
the pre-emption of state law. After applying the first part of its
test, the Court was next required to determine whether the state
law did major damage to federal interests.
The Court focused on the Act's strong anti-attachment provision
and reasoned that this provision indicated a congressional intent
that nothing interfere with the beneficiary's receipt of his bene-
fits.88 In the Court's view, this provision also ensured uniform im-
plementation of the Act and protection of the retiree's income level
established by Congress.86
Another indication of Congress' intent, according to the His-
quierdo majority, was the limited community property concept
within the Act itself. The Railroad Retirement Act grants a benefit
to spouses of the employees covered by the Act.87 These benefits
Id.
81. Id. at 590.
82. 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 662(c) (Supp. IV 1980). The Court found a distinction between garnish-
ing benefits because of need and garnishing benefits to settle property claims not based on
need. 439 U.S. at 587.
85. 439 U.S. at 583-84. The Court also noted the statutes involved in Hisquierdo were
more specific than the statute in the Wissner case where it had held that community prop-
erty law could not interfere with the beneficiary's right to life insurance proceeds.
86. Id. at 485.
87. 45 U.S.C. § 231a(c)(1) (1976).
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are, however, discontinued when the couple is divorced."8 Thus,
Congress made a deliberate choice to favor spouses over ex-
spouses, and, in contrast to the traditional concept of community
property, Congress thereby limited recognition of the spouse's con-
tributions to the marriage.
In addition to deciding that ex-spouse's claims would interfere
with the employee's receipt of benefits, the Court also believed
that such claims would frustrate congressional objectives of main-
taining an adequate labor force. Contrary to a policy encouraging
retirements, awarding an ex-spouse a share in benefits provides in-
centives for the employee to keep working because the salary
earned would be separate or non-marital property.8' A spousal
award would also reduce the amount of money received by the re-
tiree, leaving him or her with less pension income than Congress
thought necessary for support.4 These considerations highlighted
the conflict between state and federal law, mandating pre-emption
of state community property law.91
88. 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) (1976).
89. Income earned after a legal separation or divorce is separate or non-marital property.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503(a)
(1981).
90. 439 U.S. at 585. The Court rejected respondent's argument that a current offsetting
property award would not interfere with the Railroad Retirement Act. To the contrary, the
majority saw the potential for even greater harm. Not only did an offsetting, current prop-
erty award anticipate the payment of benefits, it also was inequitable for the retired em-
ployee if the benefits were never received due to death or termination of employment in the
railroad industry.
91. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented in Hisquierdo. 439 U.S. at 591. Their opin-
ion focused on the purpose of community property law to define ownership. In the pre-
emption cases prior to Hisquierdo, the Court had express statutes which directed ownership
of the property at issue. Id. at 595. Those cases concerned federal laws that not only con-
flicted with the state law but also directed the disposition of property in a way clearly in
variance with the state law. Id. at 596. In Hisquierdo, the majority could not point to a
statute which described the ownership of retirement benefits. Id. at 597.
Furthermore, according to the dissent, the majority's reliance on the anti-attachment pro-
vision was erroneous. Traditionally, anti-attachment provisions were enforceable against
creditors, but here the question was not one of indebtedness. In Hisquierdo, the issue was
ownership. Both parties had an equal interest in the community property when it was
earned during the marriage. Id. at 598.
The argument that the prohibition against anticipation conflicted with state law was also
rejected by the dissenters. The employee's inability to receive lump sum benefits was not
held comparable to a prohibition against an offsetting property award to the ex-spouse. Ac-
cording to the dissenters' definition of "anticipation," such a judgment would not conflict
with the employee's receipt of benefits. Id. at 601.
The last point raised by the dissent was the technical problem of granting a current award
to the ex-spouse when the employee might never receive any retirement benefits. This prob-
lem was not so great as to require a finding of pre-emption. As the dissent noted, the state
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Following Hisquierdo, federal retirement benefits, other than
those under the Railroad Retirement Act, continued to be divided
between spouses at the time of divorce. 2 The lower courts, in ap-
plying state property law provisions, emphasized the Hisquierdo
Court's reliance on the express and strong anti-attachment provi-
sion of the Railroad Retirement Act. In areas where similar provi-
sions were not present, state courts refused to find the area pre-
empted. Many of the arguments raised in Hisquierdo were subse-
quently raised in divorce actions involving military retired pay.
The state courts had almost uniformly held that retired pay is
community or marital property subject to division at the time of
divorce. Finally, in McCarty v. McCarty,9s the Supreme Court ac-
cepted that case to decide whether military retired pay was the
separate property of the retired member, and whether Congress
had pre-empted the application of state law in the area of military
retired pay.
THE MCCARTY DECISION
The Facts
Richard and Patricia McCarty were married in 1957 while appel-
lant Richard was attending medical school. Upon graduation, he
commenced his career with the United States Army. In 1976, the
couple separated and appellant filed a petition for dissolution of
the marriage in California. At the time of the divorce he had
served eighteen years' 4 in the Army and had attained the rank of
colonel.'5
In his petition the appellant requested the Superior Court of
California to confirm his listed assets, including his military retired
pay, as his separate property. The court, however, in agreement
with appellee's request, divided the prospective retirement benefits
as quasi-community property in accordance with California law."
courts frequently handled non-vested pensions and they considered the possibility that the
pensions might not vest when they placed a present value on the pensions. Id. at 602.
92. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (1979) and
In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185, (Mont. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981).
93. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
94. Appellant was assigned tours of duty in Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Washington, D.C.,
California and Texas. Id. at 216. Of these, only California and Texas are community prop-
erty jurisdictions.
95. Id.
96. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1981). Quasi-community property includes all
property acquired elsewhere which, had it been acquired while the spouse was domiciled in
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Appellant was ordered to pay a pro-rata share97 of his retired pay,
upon receipt, to his ex-spouse. The court retained jurisdiction to
supervise the distribution.
After completing twenty years of active duty, appellant retired
and in 1978 began receiving his military retired pay. At that time
he sought review of the decree awarding his ex-spouse a share in
his benefits, contending that the federal law governing military
benefits pre-empted the state community property law, thus
prohibiting the state from allocating a portion of his retired pay to
his former spouse. This argument was rejected and the award to
the spouse was affirmed by the California Court of Appeals. The
California Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing. 8 After
noting its appellate jurisdiction,9 the United States Supreme
Court reversed. 100
The Decision
Appellant presented two arguments to the Supreme Court. First,
he argued that military retired pay, unlike other retirement in-
come, was not deferred compensation for past services but reduced
compensation for current, reduced services. Therefore, the appel-
lant concluded because retired pay is more appropriately consid-
ered current income, it should not be divided as community prop-
erty. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted the
substantial restrictions on a retired serviceman's freedom and
agreed that retired pay could be characterized as reduced compen-
sation.101 However, the Supreme Court did not decide whether fed-
California, would be treated as community property.
97. The calculation used to determine the appellant's spouse's share was one-half the
ratio of total time he was married while in the Army to the total time he was in the Army.
Appellee was awarded approximately 45% of the retired pay. 453 U.S. at 218.
98. Id. at 219 n.12.
99. The appellant challenged a state statute that he claimed was in direct conflict with
the federal laws governing military benefits. According to the Court's review, the constitu-
tionality of the statute had been called into question and the appeal was proper. See Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
100. 453 U.S. at 219.
101. Retired officers remain members of the military service, 10 U.S.C. § 3075 (1976)
(Army); 10 U.S.C. § 8075 (1976) (Air Force); United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244 (1881).
Their retired pay may be forfeited in whole or part if they accept employment in the Fed-
eral Civil Service, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5531-5537 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); accept employment with a
foreign government, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; renounce United States citizenship, 58
Comp. Gen. 566, 568-69 (1977); or engage in certain business transactions with the Depart-
ment of Defense or other specified agencies, 37 U.S.C. § 801(c) (1976).
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eral law prohibited the states from defining retired pay as deferred
compensation.102 Instead, the Court based its decision on appel-
lant's second argument that federal law pre-empts the application
of state law as it applies to military retired pay.10 3
Citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,1°4 the Court analyzed the statu-
tory scheme governing the armed forces and concluded that federal
law pre-empted the area of military benefits and compensation.
For the majority, Congress' intent in granting a "personal entitle-
ment"105 to retired service members precluded California from di-
viding military retired pay as community property in a divorce
proceeding. The Court used a three point analysis in arriving at
this conclusion.106
First, the Court looked to the provisions allowing service mem-
bers to designate beneficiaries to receive any retired pay in arrears
at the time of their death.107 Congress stated with "force and clar-
ity"' that this designation barred recovery by any individual
other than the named beneficiaries.109 Consequently, the Court
102. The opinion of the Court states that the question of state court treatment of retired
pay as deferred compensation need not be decided. 453 U.S. at 223.
103. Id.
104. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). Hisquierdo arose in California where the state supreme court
held retirement benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act were community property sub-
ject to division upon dissolution of marriage. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that federal law regulating such benefits pre-empted California's application of com-
munity property law. Id. at 591-92.
Unlike military retired pay, the Railroad Retirement Account is funded by the employees
as well as the employers. The Act contains a clear provision against assignment or anticipa-
tion of benefits. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory,
or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assigna-
ble or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process
under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated
45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976).
The Act also incorporates a limited community property concept in that it grants an an-
nuity to spouses which terminates upon divorce. See generally supra notes 87-88 and ac-
companying text.
105. S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Seas. 6 (1968).
106. 453 U.S. at 224-30.
107. 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1976).
108. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658 (1950). Wissner involved a statute which gave
a service member the right to designate a life insurance policy beneficiary. After the service-
man's death, the Court refused to award his estranged wife a community property interest
in the life insurance proceeds where another beneficiary had been named. The issue as to
whether a spouse has a claim to the retired pay used to purchase the insurance policy was
not reached by the Court.
109. 10 U.S.C. § 2771(d) (1976).
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reasoned that if service members could defeat a community prop-
erty claim to part of their retired pay, none of their retired pay
could be treated as community property." 0
Second, the provisions of the voluntary annuity plans"' led the
Court to conclude that retired pay was the "personal entitlement"
of the service member. The annuity plans allowed service members
to direct a portion of their retired pay to beneficiaries other than
their spouses. In the Court's view, retired pay could not be charac-
terized as community property where members could avoid their
spousal sharing of such benefits. Furthermore, the annuity plans
indicated to the Court a congressional policy favoring widows and
widowers because former spouses could not receive annuities under
either plan.12
Finally, the Court stated that Congress' intent was to insure that
military retired pay "actually reach the beneficiary. "11 In discuss-
ing this intent, the Court remarked that Congress had failed to
pass an attachment provision for the purpose of enforcing court
orders favoring spouses, ex-spouses or children."" Attachment pro-
visions relating to all federal benefits were later passed, but those
provisions applied only to the enforcement of child support and
alimony obligations."' Legislation requiring federal benefits to be
paid pursuant to a court ordered or court approved property set-
tlement applied only to Civil Service and Foreign Service employ-
110. One commentator reached this same conclusion. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 14.
But see Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 661 (1950) (Minton, J. dissenting).
111. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
112. 10 U.S.C. § 1434(a) (1976) (RSFPP); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447(3), 1450(a) (1976) (SBP).
The Court observed that because retired pay carries no right of survivorship, if community
property laws were applied, a widow would be left with nothing while an ex-spouse could
receive an immediate offsetting award of community property representing her interest in
the future benefits. Under 10 U.S.C. § 1450(b) (1976) an SBP annuity is discontinued if the
surviving spouse remarries prior to age 60, whereas the ex-spouse's award would not termi-
nate. The widow's annuity is also offset by Social Security payments, 10 U.S.C. § 1451
(1976), whereas a property division is not. The Court concluded that Congress could not
have intended these "anomalous results." 453 U.S. at 227-28 n.21.
113. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584 (1979), cited in McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. at 228. The Hisquierdo Court stressed the importance of the anti-attachment pro-
vision in the Railroad Retirement Act protecting the payments from any legal process. A
similar provision is not included in the statutory scheme for military benefits.
114. See H.R. REP. No. 92-481, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1972) and S. REP. No. 92-1089,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1972), cited in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 229.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). Subsequent legislation provided that alimony "does not in-
clude any payment or transfer of property. . . in compliance with any community property
settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between spouses
or former spouses." 42 U.S.C. § 462(c) (Supp. IV. 1980).
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ees.11'6 The Court stated that because Congress had not included
military benefits, in such legislation, they could not be reached by
a former spouse seeking a property division.
Applying this three point analysis, the Supreme Court held that
a conflict did exist between the federal statutes governing military
retired pay and the state community property laws. Having found
a conflict, the Court's inquiry then shifted to whether the assertion
of a community right would damage "clear and substantial" fed-
eral interests.11 7 The Supreme Court recognized that awarding a
share of the retirement benefits to the former spouse would de-
crease the income level that Congress thought necessary for the
retired service member"' and reduce participation in the annuity
plans.119 Further, the Court agreed that such awards would disrupt
military personnel management and reduce the value of retired
pay as an inducement to re-enlist. At the same time, older service
members would be more likely to remain on active duty since their
earned income would be separate property. The added incentive on
the part of older members to continue working would result in the
demise of a "youthful and vigorous" military force.120 Thus, finding
that the application of community property laws conflicted with
legitimate goals of Congress and frustrated federal objectives, the
Supreme Court held that military retired pay was the separate
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 83450)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (Civil Service); Pub. L. No. 96-465, 94
Stat. 2113 (1980) (Foreign Service). Legislation currently pending before Congress would
recognize an ex-spouse's claim to military retired pay under certain circumstances. See infra
notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
117. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). There, the Small Business Associ-
ation (SBA) tried to collect a loan made to a Texas couple. Under Texas coverture law, a
married woman could not enter a contract to bind separate property. The Court declined to
adopt the arguments of the SBA to ignore Texas law and allow the government to claim the
wife's assets. The Court held state interests "should be overridden by the federal courts only
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served
consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is
applied." Id. at 352.
118. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979). The Hisquierdo Court re-
lied on 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976), a straight-forward provision exempting annuities under the
Railroad Retirement Act from any legal process and forbidding the anticipation of future
payments. The McCarty dissent criticized the Court's analogy to Hisquierdo when the only
comparable statute governing military benefits, 37 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976), rather than for-
bidding assignment, permits it. 453 U.S. at 242.
119. The Court thought a serviceman would be less likely to set aside a portion of his
pay for an annuity where a community property division has already diminished the amount
available to him. Citing McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 389 (1905), the Court refused to
reverse the "order of the statute" and grant an ex-spouse greater rights than a widow. 453
U.S. at 233.
120. 453 U.S. at 234.
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property of the retired member. While recognizing the inequities in
its decision,121 the Court deferred to Congress the responsibility of
changing the laws.
122
The Dissent
In a strong dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by two other jus-
tices, 12  criticized the majority's purported reliance on Hisquierdo
and other pre-emption cases, their diverting analysis of tangential
statutes and legislative history, and their finding of pre-emption by
"negative implication" rather than by direct action of Congress.12
The dissent argued that in Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court had
found only limited powers of review in family law questions "to
determine whether Congress has 'positively required by direct en-
actment' that state law be pre-empted.' ' 25 According to the dis-
sent, the McCarty majority disregarded this language because it
was not able to find the requisite "direct enactment" by
Congress.'
To support its argument, the dissent took notice of the fact that
the Supreme Court had pre-empted community property law on
only five prior occasions.12 Justice Rehnquist charged the majority
with an illogical extension of precedent since each of the past deci-
sions involved a clear statement of congressional intent to direct
property interests contrary to the state community property laws.
The statutory scheme covering military retirement benefits, in con-
121. As an indication of just how the lower courts will handle the inequities which the
Supreme Court avoided, the court in Erspan v. Badgett, 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1981), dis-
cussed a simple example. Under McCarty, if a couple had $50,000 of community property
and the husband was entitled to $50,000 in military retired pay, upon dissolution the hus-
band would receive $75,000 and the wife, only $25,000. But, as the Court stated,
"[p]resumably,. . [the] court, finding that a $50,000 award to the former wife is essential to
a 'just and right' division, will allocate a larger share of the divisible community estate to
the former wife." Id. at 28 n.2. However, this would not be possible in California, Louisiana
or New Mexico where the state law requires an equal division.
122. 453 U.S. at 235. The Court offered some consolation when it noted ex-spouses may
be entitled to Social Security benefits, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)-402(f) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), and may be able to garnish retired pay for support, see supra note 115 and accompa-
nying text.
123. Justices Brennan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.
124. 453 U.S. at 236-46.
125. 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)), cited in Mc-
Carty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 236.
126. 453 U.S. at 236-37.
127. 453 U.S. at 238. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Yiatchos v.
Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338
U.S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905). See supra notes 57-91 and accompa-
nying text.
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trast, contained no such express provisions upon which the major-
ity could rely.1"
Further, the dissenters objected to the majority's reliance upon
and inconsistent application of Hisquierdo. The Railroad Retire-
ment Act at issue in Hisquierdo, the dissent noted, embodied a
limited community property concept, evidencing a conscious choice
by Congress to draw a line with respect to the interests of a di-
vorced spouse. Even though the statutory scheme for military re-
tired pay did not include community property concepts indicating
Congress had addressed the issue, the dissent noted that the Mc-
Carty majority found total pre-emption. 1 9 Thus, the dissenters ar-
gued, the majority found an intent to pre-empt based not on con-
gressional action, but on congressional inaction.
Conceding that annuities and unpaid arrearages may be ex-
cluded from community property treatment, the dissent suggested
that state law be overridden only to the extent it conflicts with the
federal law. 130 They also suggested that the leap from a narrow
128. The McCarty court cited the McCune case where an earlier court had held that the
Homestead Act, which included a schedule directing the land title to pasg to a home-
steader's widow, superseded a state statute granting an interest in the property to the home-
steader's daughter. Congress did not, however, list a priority for those having an interest in
military retired pay, so that the application of community property law neither conflicted
with nor could reverse the order of the statute, as the majority contends. 453 U.S. at 238.
In Free v. Bland and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, Treasury Regulations mandating that upon
the death of one co-owner of savings bonds, the other became "sole and absolute" owner,
were upheld over community property claims of the surviving spouse. The McCarty case
does not include such language. Id. at 241.
In Wissner, a serviceman's federal right to designate a beneficiary as the sole owner of the
proceeds of a National Servicemen's Life Insurance (NSLI) policy could not be frustrated
by the imposition of a community property claim. No decision was rendered as to whether
the retired pay used to purchase the policy could be treated as community property. With-
out justification, the McCarty opinion took an "analytic jump," ruling that retired pay could
not be community property because a portion of it could not be treated as community prop-
erty. Id. at 239-41.
Finally in Hisquierdo, the Court held Railroad Retirement benefits could not be treated
as community property because the statute contained a strong anti-attachment provision.
Justice Rehnquist contended that the comparable provision for military retired pay was
actually the opposite of an anti-attachment provision. The Court cited 37 U.S.C. § 701(a)
(1976) as support for its position that enlisted men cannot assign pay. 453 U.S. at 241-44.
On December 19, 1977, the Department of Defense Military Pay and Allowances Entitle-
ments Manual was amended, permitting retired members to authorize allotments to former
spouses. See Erspan v. Badgett, 674 F.2d 550, 553 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981); 37 U.S.C. § 701(d)
(1976).
129. 453 U.S. at 244.
130. Id. See also In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1974) (the court cannot divest control of a beneficiary's proceeds under an
NSLI policy, but other available community assets can be used for equitable division); In re
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pre-emption to complete pre-emption in the area of military re-
tired pay infringes on the states' power to regulate marriage and
divorce in the absence of Congress' "direct enactment."1 ''
ANALYSIS
The Pre-Emption Test is Disregarded
The Supreme Court's decision in McCarty disregarded that
Court's established pre-emption test. The majority was unable to
show that Congress, by direct enactment, required that state law
be pre-empted, or that the application of state law caused major
damage to clear and substantial federal interests. Because these el-
ements of the pre-emption test were not met, the Court erred in
striking down California's law as it applied to military retired pay.
In Hisquierdo, the Court found the asserted state right con-
flicted with the express terms of federal law. A careful reading of
that case reveals the Court's emphasis on section 231m of the Rail-
road Retirement Act.132 The Hisquierdo Court repeatedly noted
that railroad retirement benefits were exempt from any legal pro-
cess whatsoever. Provisions in the Railroad Retirement Act, in the
Court's view, were intended to preclude any person from making
any claim to the benefits or reducing the amount of benefits re-
ceived by the employee. The Court inferred that the anti-attach-
ment section excluded claims by former spouses, and the Court ex-
pressly indicated that the employee was the sole owner of any
benefits.3's
Although the Supreme Court applied reasoning substantially
similar to Hisquierdo in the McCarty decision, it failed to focus on
the lack of an express federal provision similar to section 231m. 1 4
Marriage of Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812 (1980), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Milhan v. Milhan, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) (the pertinent federal objectives of the NSLI Act are
to protect the choice of a beneficiary, not to secure an economic stake in retired pay); cf.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (conflicting law
should be pre-empted only to the extent necessary); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d
653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979) (under ERISA, Congress did not intend to pre-empt the division
of pension benefits, only their regulation).
131. 453 U.S. at 246. Justice Rehnquist is unable to agree that because an ex-spouse can
garnish retired pay for support, she cannot obtain a portion in a property division. This is a
"negative implication" and not the "positive requirement" of Congress which is necessary
for a finding of pre-emption.
132. 439 U.S. at 583-84.
133. Id. at 590.
134. As the dissent pointed out, the only applicable federal statute governing military
retired pay permits, rather than prohibits, assignment. See supra note 118 and accompany-
[Vol. 13
McCarty v. McCarty
Relying on a Senate statement that retired pay was historically the
personal entitlement of the service member, 3 5 the majority ana-
lyzed several features of the statutory scheme governing retired
pay and concluded that Congress had spoken with force and clarity
to pre-empt California law. The statutes on which the Court relied,
however, were statutes granting a right to designate beneficiaries to
receive annuities 6 or unpaid arrearages,8 7 and were not a clear
expression by Congress as to the ownership of the retired pay it-
self. The established rights of a beneficiary other than the spouse
to claim payments subsequent to the service member's death is an
inappropriate analogy, and should not have been the basis of an
argument for defeating a former spouse's claim to retired pay dur-
ing the member's lifetime. 8 8 The majority disregarded the fact
that Congress had not acted to designate the owners of retired pay,
and instead discussed such tangential issues as proposed legislation
which was never enacted and tangential federal provisions affect-
ing other federal employees. The military provisions did not satisfy
the Court's articulated pre-emption requirement of a direct enact-
ment by Congress. In addition, because the federal statutes were
silent as to the ownership of retired pay, California's community
property law was not in direct conflict with them." e
The McCarty majority found that the application of California
law interfered with several federal objectives. First, it noted the
need for uniformity in national programs. According to the Court,
allowing each state to apply its own laws defeated this goal.'4 0 Al-
though uniformity is a valid federal interest, Congress recognizes
the ultimate differences between state and federal law, and acts
"against the background of the total corpus juris of the states.'"
The areas of domestic relations and property law are ones tradi-
tionally reserved to the states' authority. The McCarty Court
ing text.
135. S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3294.
136. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
138. 453 U.S. at 244. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 17.
139. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 14. Judge Goldberg recognizes the retirement stat-
utes are silent as to whether Congress intended to adopt or pre-empt state law. His position
is the latter. Justice Rehnquist also found the federal statutes silent but he argued for adop-
tion. 453 U.S. at 245.
140. 453 U.S. at 234.
141. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 591 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966)).
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chose to discard state law entirely in this instance, rather than rec-
onciling it with the federal scheme for retired pay.14
The majority also reasoned that the application of California law
would do major damage to congressional power to raise and man-
age a young and vigorous Army.143 Dividing retired pay between
the service member and the former spouse may, arguably, provide
an incentive for the service member to remain on active duty. In so
doing, the member continues to receive active duty pay, which is
clearly separate property earned after divorce, while the former
spouse receives none of this income. In utilizing this line of reason-
ing, the Court rather simply reduces a service member's decision as
to whether to remain on active duty to a decision based on only
one factor. Moreover, even if the decision to retire was based on
this single consideration, the Court never indicated how many
older service members would actually be affected.14 4 There was no
evidence that a reduced incentive to retire among older and divorc-
ing service members would cause a significant disruption in the or-
derly promotion of younger members. The Court's assumptions
failed to show that applying state law would cause major damage
to the federal interest.
Finally, the Court reasoned that allowing state law to reduce the
amount of benefits received by the retired member would interfere
with federal law. The Court stated that Congress had specified an
income amount that it thought necessary for the retired member,
and awarding a former spouse a portion of the retired pay would
upset the income balance encompassed in the statute. This argu-
ment is weakened, however, by the fact that Congress did not in-
clude an anti-attachment provision insuring the service members'
receipt of full retired pay.145 Not only could creditors reduce the
142. See 453 U.S. at 240-41. Justice Rehnquist accuses the majority of an "analytic
jump" from parts of retired pay as separate property to all of retired pay as separate
property.
143. Id. at 234. The majority compared the ownership provisions for savings bonds as an
inducement to purchase with the personal entitlement of retired pay as an inducement to
enlist or reenlist. Because the retired pay statutes are not clear as to the ownership of the
benefits, it is a faulty comparison. A savings bond purchaser can rely on the federal law
which designates the beneficiary as the sole owner upon the purchaser's death. Retired ser-
vice members do not have a statute on which they could rely.
144. The majority opinion does not contain any statistics as to the number of service
members who would be in a position to turn down retirement in favor of remaining on
active duty.
145. Military pay cannot be attached prior to receipt by the service member. See
Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. 20 (1846). But see 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976) (Railroad Re-
tirement benefits cannot be attached before or after receipt).
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members' pay, but a former spouse could garnish a portion of the
retired pay to satisfy alimony or support obligations.1' The com-
munity property rights of the former spouse would not necessarily
upset the financial balance of the statute any more than other al-
lowable claims. The Court was interested in -protecting service
members' retired pay, but the state law interference it found was
not supported by a clear conflict between the state and federal
statutes nor by factual evidence of major damage to federal inter-
ests as required by the Court's pre-emption test.14 7 The federal
military objectives could have been preserved without denying the
states' power to regulate divorces. Even if substantial federal inter-
ests were injured, the Court did not structure the pre-emption to
protect those interests only, but found pre-emption of California
law in the entire area of military retired pay.14 8
POLICIES OF THE MILITARY AND THE STATE
Goals for the Military Against Goals for the Family
The McCarty decision disregarded not only the Supreme Court's
pre-emption test, but also the state courts' treatment of domestic
relations, property ownership, and. military retired pay. Thus, the
decision can be criticized for its legal soundness as well as its
soundness in light of established state policies.
In the area of domestic relations, many state legislatures have
passed statutes recognizing the contributions of both spouses to
the marriage.14' They have also indicated a preference for abolish-
ing or limiting the use of alimony in favor of property settle-
ments.1 50 Consistent with such policies, the state courts have tradi-
146. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
147. 453 U.S. at 236-37.
148. Id. at 245. The dissenters would override community property law only as far as it
conflicts with federal law. To find a conflict, the majority relied on the annuity provisions
and the statute allowing for the designation of a beneficiary to receive unpaid arrearages.
Neither of these statutes deals with the whole of retired pay. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 126-27 (1973).
149. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West Supp. 1981-1982); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, 1 503 (1981). See also Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. 91 (1979) (Com-
missioners' Prefatory Note).
150. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Historical and Practice
Notes). As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in In re Marriage of Aschwanden, 82 IMI. 2d 31,
411 N.E.2d 238 (1980): "Where the property available to the [spouse] is sufficient to satisfy
that spouse's need and entitlements, the use of maintenance should be limited. . . . If there
is not sufficient marital property, however, maintenance should be considered." Id. at 38,
411 N.E.2d at 242. Texas has abolished all but contractual alimony between the former
spouses. Freed & Foster, supra note 17, at 252-57.
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tionally characterized military retired pay as an asset of the
marriage.
The McCarty Court not only rejected that approach but in its
opinion further assumed that property distributions are not based
on need.1"1 Using this assumption, denying a former spouse an in-
terest in retired pay does not deprive the spouse of a means of
support; ideally, a former spouse in need of support should look to
alimony. There are several problems with this line of reasoning.
First, it forces the states to revert to the concept that property
earned during marriage belongs to the spouse holding title.'52
Property principles based on title undermine the theory that mar-
riage is a partnership to which both spouses contribute. Second,
the Court's assumption about property distributions is incorrect.
Many states consider the respective financial positions and support
needs of the spouses as relevant facts in determining the allocation
of property between them.0 3 Third, the Court's position leaves
some former spouses with no means of support in those states
which have either abolished alimony or substantially restricted its
use. 154
In addition to overriding established state policy in the area of
domestic relations, the McCarty decision replaces an ex-spouse's
established interest in military retired pay under state law with an
admittedly less valuable and more tentative right to alimony. The
Court relies on state alimony laws and Social Security to soften the
potential hardships the denial of military benefits imposes on for-
mer spouses. 55 State alimony laws, however, are an inadequate
substitute for the interest which the Court abolished.
Prior to McCarty, many state courts awarded an interest in a
service member's retired pay to the former spouse "if, as and
when" it was paid.' 56 The former spouse received a periodic pay-
ment similar to alimony. The right to receive a portion of the pay-
ments ended upon the death of the retired member. 5 7 Such termi-
151. 453 U.S. at 230.
152. See Freed & Foster, supra note 17, at 249.
153. See e.g., Asaz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West Supp. 1981-1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-
712 (1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503 (1981); Mo. Ray. STAT. § 452.330 (West Supp. 1982).
154. Several states still require that the ex-spouse is faultless before they will award
alimony. Freed & Foster, supra note 17, at 249.
155. 453 U.S. at 235-36.
156. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1976).
157. See S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Seass. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 3294, 3300; In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 825 (1974); In re Marriage of Musser, 70 l. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (1979);
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nation parallels the termination of alimony payments where no
provisions have been made to continue payments after the death of
the supporting spouse. However, two significant distinctions be-
tween property awards and alimony leave the former spouse in an
unfavorable position where only alimony is received. First, a prop-
erty right is a permanent interest in the retired pay. An alimony
award, on the other hand, received by the voluntary payments of
the retired member or by attachment of retired pay, is subject to
modification or discontinuation."' This feature of alimony gives ei-
ther spouse an opportunity to modify the terms of the divorce
agreement to reflect their changing financial positions. Frequently,
alimony is discontinued when a former spouse remarries,15 1
whereas ownership of property awarded pursuant to a divorce
agreement continues indefinitely.
The second distinction of importance to a former spouse is that
a property right can be transferred, assigned or inherited, while
alimony is for the sole benefit of the former spouse and terminates
upon death.16 0 Prior to the McCarty decision, one court held that a
spouse's property interest in her former husband's military retired
pay could pass to her estate should she predecease him.161 Al-
though the McCarty Court was not attempting to equate the pay-
ment of alimony with a property right in retired pay, the decision's
practical effect is to preclude former spouses from sharing in a pre-
viously recognized state property right.
The Impact of McCarty on a Service Member's Divorce
The McCarty decision is, on its face, a favorable decision for ser-
vice members. In practical application, however, the decision may
actually place the retired members at a disadvantage. Military re-
tired pay is a substantial asset in most marriages and the over-
whelming majority of states allow their courts wide discretion in
Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978).
158. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-317(a) (West Supp. 1981-1982); CAL. CIV. CODE §
4801(a) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 510(a) (1981); Mo. REV. STAT. §
452.370(1) (West Supp. 1982); Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. § 316(a)
(1979).
159. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-317(b) (West Supp. 1981-1982), CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4801(b) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1 510(b) (1981); Mo. REV. STAT. §
452.370(2) (West Supp. 1982); Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. § 316(b)
(1979).
160. Id.
161. In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Mont. 1980), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981).
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equitably dividing marital assets.' McCarty precludes state
courts from directly awarding retired pay to the former spouse, al-
though other award alternatives are available. Depending on a
couple's financial position prior to the divorce, such alternatives
may have varying effects.
First, as the Supreme Court noted, the former spouse might be
entitled to alimony. Using this method to allocate the couple's as-
sets, the retired member receives a tax advantage. Although retired
pay is taxable as income,6 s the member is entitled to a deduction
for any amounts paid to the former spouse as alimony or mainte-
nance."" As previously noted, alimony is much less valuable to the
former spouse than a property award of retired pay. An award of a
property interest, however, would not offer tax advantages to the
retired member.
A second alternative available to the courts is to give the former
spouse a current, offsetting award. If a divorcing service member
has not served the required twenty years to become vested in the
retired pay, the former spouse may receive a much larger share of
marital assets immediately, while the member has only a possible
future benefit. If the member ultimately does not receive the re-
tired pay, due to death or some other disqualification, the former
spouse would have received more than an equitable share of the
property.1 "5 Even if the retired pay is subsequently received by the
member, the former spouse has already received non-taxable prop-
erty with immediate enjoyment, while the retired member has a
right to taxable income at a date in the future.
The effects of the McCarty decision on the division of marital
assets will vary based upon the amount of total assets available for
distribution." Where a couple has, in addition to military retired
pay, no other substantial assets and the former spouse qualifies for
alimony, the retired member will probably be at an advantage due
to the available tax deductions. Where a couple has substantial as-
sets beyond the retired pay, the courts may employ the second al-
ternative and grant an offsetting award. In these circumstances, a
162. Freed & Foster, supra note 17, at 249-51.
163. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(11) (1976).
164. 26 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1976).
165. Most courts, in dividing retired pay prior to McCarty, took into consideration the
possibility that the pension might never vest and reduced the ex-spouse's award accordingly.
166. The advantages and disadvantages of an alimony award instead of a property set-
tlement are also complicated by the fact that alimony can be modified or terminated. See
supra notes 158-60.
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wealthy service member is treated differently than a less wealthy
member.
Finally, the courts may be faced with a situation where a service
member is entitled to military retired pay and the former spouse is
entitled to a private pension. The member may have a claim in
both retirement benefits while the former spouse will be left with
only a portion of the private pension upon dissolution of the mar-
riage. This would probably be a rare occurrence, however, because
most service members are frequently transferred and their spouses
are not in one location long enough to acquire a vested pension.
The variation of marital property situations which may face the
courts is limitless. Following McCarty, in order to continue a sys-
tem of fair distribution of marital assets and equitable recognition
of each spouse's contributions to the marriage, the states will have
to place greater reliance on the intelligence and discretion of the
divorce judges and the prompt action by Congress setting rational
guidelines.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION: THE MILITARY SPOUSE RETIREMENT
EQUITY ACT
On April 6, 1981, Representative Schroeder introduced House of
Representatives Bill 3039 to amend Title 10 of the United States
Code. 167 Before the Supreme Court's decision in McCarty, several
members of Congress recognized the problems and inequities faced
by the former spouses of military members. The proposed legisla-
tion, titled the "Military Spouse Retirement Equity Act," would
grant a former spouse up to a fifty percent interest in the mem-
ber's military retired pay16 and up to a fifty-five percent interest
in any annuities.169
In order to qualify for the interest, the bill requires the former
spouse to have been married to the service member for at least ten
years, during which the member performed creditable duty in the
military services.1 70 The interest is disqualified only upon the for-
mer spouse's remarriage before reaching age sixty or upon death.
17 1
The former spouse's right to retired pay is also discontinued if the
service member dies, but in that event, the ex-spouse may be enti-
167. H.R. 3039, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
168. Id. at 4, line 3.
169. Id. at 12, line 23.
170. Id. at 2, line 10.
171. Id. at 5, line 1.
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tied to an annuity. 72
Administratively, the service member's pay or the present
spouse's annuity would be reduced and a portion directed to the
former spouse pursuant to a divorce agreement or divorce decree
for maintenance, or a property settlement. Proposed section 1465
specifically states that this Act will not pre-empt the rights of any
spouse under any law of the states.M Because the McCarty deci-
sion pre-empted all state rights in this area, the provision would be
clearer if redrafted to expressly indicate the extent to which a state
can apply its own laws.
This legislation, if enacted, would more closely harmonize state
policies on domestic relations with the federal laws. The Act re-
flects congressional awareness of each spouse's contribution to the
marriage. The Act would insure the uniformity which the Supreme
Court noted was essential for national programs by providing
guidelines for the state courts.
These guidelines would protect service members from inequita-
ble distributions of marital assets by making clear that the right of
the former spouse is contingent on the member's actual receipt of
retired pay. Such a provision is similar to the state courts' "if, as
and when" distribution concept.17 4 Under the proposed legislation,
the former spouse would be entitled to a portion of the retired pay
in the future, enabling the courts to divide current marital assets
more equally. This also would avoid awarding the former spouse a
larger asset share to offset the member's anticipated retired pay.
The Act will also protect former spouses where their interest in
retired pay will be deemed an absolute right with attributes similar
to property rights and alimony. Unlike alimony, which is based on
the needs of the former spouse and the court's discretion, a former
spouse will be automatically entitled to an interest in retired pay.
In order to eliminate collection problems, the payments due the
former spouse would be sent directly by the government to the for-
mer spouse, rather than to the retired member. The Act provides,
however, that the spouse's interest terminates upon the remarriage
of that spouse prior to reaching the age of sixty or upon the death
of that spouse. This provision is a compromise between the posi-
tion of the state courts, which had awarded former spouses a com-
plete property interest, and the position of the McCarty court,
172. Id. at 5, line 4.
173. Id. at 7, line 25.
174. For a discussion of this concept, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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which awarded retired pay entirely to the retired member.
The legislation is currently pending in the House of Representa-
tives following an assignment to the House Committee on Armed
Forces.'7 5
CONCLUSION
In McCarty, the Supreme Court decided that the state courts
were not free to apply community property laws to military retired
pay, and held that the federal statutory framework pre-empted
community property law. The decision rested on the inference
that, because the military retirement statutes were silent, Congress
intended to pre-empt state law in the area of domestic relations
where a federal right was involved. Although the majority dis-
cussed a wide range of federal statutes relating to military retired
pay and other federal benefits in arriving at its conclusion, it failed
to address well established state policies in the area of domestic
relations.
The dissent noted that the Court's opinion failed to address and
comply with the well accepted requirements for a finding of pre-
emption. In the absence of a clear statute directing ownership of
military retired pay, the dissenters would have allowed the states
to continue to apply their own laws.
The McCarty decision appears to offer protection to service
members. In practical effect, however, the decision may be advan-
tageous or disadvantageous to a service member, depending on
other facts and circumstances. State courts have wide discretion to
equitably divide assets pursuant to a divorce proceeding. Even in
light of McCarty, this discretion will continue to play an important
role.
Legislation has recently been introduced in Congress which
would grant a former spouse an automatic right to military retired
pay and annuities. This legislation, if enacted, would provide state
courts with guidelines for a just distribution of what is potentially
a valuable asset. Neither the McCarty decision nor the proposed
legislation will resolve all the problems associated with the marital
allocation of military retired pay. However, the proposed legisla-
tion is a significant reflection of congressional recognition and sup-
port for those important state policies which affirm marriage as a
shared enterprise entitling each spouse to a share of all the marital
175. 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 28,305 (97th Cong. 1981-1982).
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assets. Congress should act to pass this legislation or similar provi-
sions to establish a federal position on military retired pay with
respect to the states' policy to protect former spouses.
SANDRA D. OLISZEWICZ
